ABSTRACT With the rapid advance of the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing technologies, the IoT-oriented health is expected to greatly improve the quality of healthcare service. However, data security and privacy concerns have become one of the biggest issues in smart health applications. As a potential and promising solution, attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) can provide fine-grained keyword search and access control over the encrypted data at the same time. Nevertheless, prior ABKS schemes cannot simultaneously support fine-grained, effective, and accurate data retrieval over hierarchical data. In this paper, to tackle these issues, we propose a fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme over hierarchical data by leveraging ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) and ranked multi-keyword search (RMKS) technologies. Then, we prove that our proposed scheme is selectively secure through security analysis and we also show the practicability and feasibility of the proposed scheme by performance evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has developed rapidly through extending and expanding on the basis of the Internet. It has earned widespr1ead acceptance in various fields and been applied to all walks of life, ranging from healthcare, intelligent transportation, government work, smart home, environmental monitoring, and so on [1] - [3] . For example, in IoT-oriented applications, the IoT devices (e.g., conventional sensor and embedded or wearable devices) worn on or implanted inside the wearer's body are leveraged to monitor and gather the physiological symptoms, such as body temperature, blood pressure, heartbeat, etc. These collected data can be formed into the wearer's Electronic Health Records (EHRs). For medical practitioners and healthcare providers, EHRs are of crucial importance in facilitating accurate prevention of various diseases and improving healthcare quality and its service levels, e.g. accurate, timely
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Razi Iqbal. diagnose and treatment. In literature, this setting is known as IoT-oriented Health System [4] , [5] .
Typically, in an IoT-oriented Health System, some healthcare data are gathered and transmitted from the embedded or wearable devices to the cloud server. In consideration of the privacy-sensitive nature of the healthcare data, there remain many concerns regarding security and privacy that require to be tackled [6] , [7] . For example, the shared EHRs commonly have features of multi-level hierarchy and are expected to be accessed by authorized users with distinct access privileges (e.g., Chief physician, associate chief physician, attending doctor and medical doctor). Considering the semi-reliable nature of cloud (i.e., it does not only perform the data users' task in a trustworthy manner but also attempts to find out some sensitive information), encryption on healthcare data before outsourcing is generally deemed as a straightforward approach to ensure data privacy. Whereas, how to grant fine-grained access controls over encrypted hierarchical EHRs becomes an ongoing challenge. Ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) [8] , [9] , as a special type of ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption (CP-ABE) [10] , [11] , is considered as a prospective primitive, which can achieve one-to-many encryption and fine-grained access control over encrypted hierarchical data. In a CP-HABE scheme, ciphertext referred to as encrypted hierarchical data is associated with access control and secret key is labeled with a set of attributes. The hierarchical data can be accessed by data users with various access privileges if and only if the attribute set embedded in the secret key matches the access control attached to the ciphertext.
Apart from supporting data owners in enforcing fine-grained access control over encrypted hierarchical EHRs, enabling data users to retrieve these encrypted EHRs is also critical in IoT-oriented Health System. As the system scales, conventional data sharing technologies are inefficient. For instance, CP-HABE schemes will return all the encrypted EHRs to data users in case the user attributes hidden in the secret key satisfy the access control related to the EHRs ciphertext. Nevertheless, not all returned results are within interest for data users, which will result in a considerable waste of computation and storage resources. For instance, a medical practitioner may prefer to search for some medical history involving a certain physiological condition rather than know a mental illness or other transmitted diseases.
As a consequence, how to quickly filter out the target results according to the interests of data users remains another challenge. Searchable encryption (SE) [12] - [14] is regarded as an effective solution, which allows data users to conduct ciphertext retrieval depended on data user-specified keywords. Combined with the CP-HABE scheme, ciphertext-policy attributed-based keyword search over hierarchical data (CP-ABKS-HD) is proposed by Miao et al. [15] , [16] to support not only fine-grained data access but also efficient keyword search over hierarchical data. Furthermore, to improve the search result accuracy, a ciphertext-policy attributed-based multi-keyword search scheme over hierarchical data (CP-ABMKS-HD) [15] is introduced to support fine-grained multi-keyword search.
However, the CP-ABMKS-HD scheme suffers from two possible drawbacks that affect user searching experience. On one hand, without having any pre-knowledge of the encrypted data, each retrieved file must be traversed by data users to capture the most suitable and preferred ones, which incurs considerable post-processing overhead [17] . On the other hand, sending back all files containing queried keywords may lead to large needless network traffic, which in practice contradicts today's ''pay-as-you-use'' mode [18] . Hence, a number of ranked multi-keyword SE schemes [18] - [21] are designed to return the most relevant files instead of undifferentiated files, which solves the above-mentioned defects. However, all these solutions are incapable of supporting fine-grained multi-keyword retrieval over encrypted hierarchical data.
Aiming to alleviate these limitations afore-presented, a fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme over hierarchical data is for the first time proposed in this paper.
Taking the IoT-oriented health system as a use case, we deal with the problems of fine-grained search over hierarchical data, effective and accurate search functionality and efficient data deciphering simultaneously. The main contributions of this paper are enumerated below:
• Fine-grained search over hierarchical data. In our fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme, data users are allowed to make queries for hierarchical EHRs data of their interest based on the specific keywords without exposing the underlying EHRs data. Besides, fine-grained access privilege control over data is also supported in this scheme.
• Effective and accurate search functionality. In our fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme, to avoid returning the ineffective and inaccurate search results, ranked multi-keyword search functionality is provided to enable data users to gain the most relevant EHRs with high search accuracy.
• Efficient data deciphering. In our fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme, the computationintensive operations in the decryption phase are almost completed by cloud server while marginal operations are left to data users, which greatly improves the efficiency of data recovery. Thereby, the bandwidth and computation time can be greatly reduced when data users decipher EHRs ciphertext with resource-constraint IoT devices. In addition, the proposed scheme is proved to be selectively secure against both chosen plaintext attacks and chosen keyword attacks by the security analysis. Besides, the performance evaluation is demonstrated that it is feasible for the IoT-oriented health system.
Organization: The organization is outlined as follows. In detail, the related works are reviewed in section II. After that, we show the preliminaries including notations, Lagrange interpolation method, hard problem, hierarchical access structure, etc in section III. Then, the system model, threat model, system framework and security model are depicted in section IV. Next, the concrete construction of our scheme is presented in section V. The security analysis and performance evaluation are elaborated in section VI, respectively. Lastly, the summary is concluded in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing solutions to conduct fine-grained ranked multikeyword search over hierarchical data can be categorized into two primitives: hierarchical attribute-based encryption (HABE) and ranked searchable encryption (RSE).
A. HIERARCHICAL ATTRIBUTED-BASED ENCRYPTION (HABE)
To address the limitations of coarse-grained access control schemes, the ABE scheme was proposed by Goyal et al. [22] . Depending on whether the access policy is associated with ciphertext or secret key, ABE scheme can be roughly divided into two variants, CP-ABE [10] and Key policy ABE (KP-ABE) [22] . Compared with KP-ABE, CP-ABE allows data owners themselves to independently choose fine-grained access policies over the encrypted data, which is more appropriate for IoT-oriented health applications. In a CP-ABE scheme, the access structure is attached to a ciphertext and the secret key is labeled with the attribute set. A user can decrypt the encrypted data in case the attribute set hidden in the user's secret key matches the access structure associated with the ciphertext. Nevertheless, the hierarchical data structure is not considered in most existing CP-ABE schemes. To enforce hierarchical fine-grained data structure on the encrypted data, Wang et al. designed a hierarchical CP-ABE scheme [23] by combining hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [24] and a standard CP-ABE scheme [10] together. Subsequently, many hierarchical CP-ABE schemes [25] - [27] with special functionalities are developed. Specifically, supporting scalability, flexibility and fine-granularity can be gained in [25] . Continuous auxiliary input resilient-leakage is supported in [26] and hierarchically organized large groups can be achieved in [27] . Whereas, they are all out of consideration of the data characteristics of multi-level hierarchy. To support hierarchical access control over encrypted hierarchical data, ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) schemes [8] , [9] were built.
B. RANKED SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION (RSE)
A SE scheme in the public key setting (PEKS) was first proposed by Boneh et al. [13] , which allows that anyone with the public key can remotely store the encrypted data on cloud server while only authorized users can retrieve the encrypted data. To achieve fine-grained keyword search, Zheng et al. [28] proposed a ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption with keyword search (CP-ABKS), which allows data user to verify the correctness of returned results. However, they also did not consider access control of hierarchical data. To tackle this issue, ciphertext policy attribute-based keyword search schemes over hierarchical data (CP-ABKS-HD) are raised by Miao et al. [15] , which support fine-grained single keyword search and fine-grained multi-keyword search. However, not all search results in these schemes are the most relevant files. To avoid returning undifferentiated files, a secure ranked keyword search scheme in single-keyword setting was raised by Wang et al. [29] to return the most relevant search results to data users. However, the search results may be inaccurate. To support ranked multi-keyword search functionality, ranked multi-keyword search scheme was proposed by Cao et al. [18] , where the weight of each keyword is out of consideration. Later, ranked multi-keyword search schemes considering the keyword weight were suggested [20] , [21] , [30] .
Compared with the existing schemes listed in Table 1 , supporting the functionalities of fine-grained access control, hierarchical data share, multi-keyword search, ranked keyword retrieval and outsourced decryption are not welladdressed. To simultaneously gain these desirable features, our main work is motivated to design a Fine-grained Ranked Multi-keyword Search Scheme.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some preliminaries used in our scheme are introduced. Specifically, notations, Lagrange interpolation method, hard problem and hierarchical access structure are provided.
A. NOTATIONS
The notations of the scheme are described as Table 2 . 
B. LAGRANGE INTERPOLATION METHOD
Assume that the Lagrange interpolation polynomial is defined as:
C. DBDH PROBLEM Definition 1 (DBDH Problem [33] ): Given a decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) quintuple [g,
0 × G 1 , it's hard to determine whether Z = e(g, g) 1 2 3 or Z = R in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT), where R is a random element of G 1 .
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D. HIERARCHICAL ACCESS STRUCTURE
Let T be a hierarchical tree describing an access structure which is divided into σ access levels. Each node of T is defined as (x, y), where x denotes the row of a node in T , y denotes the column of a node in T . The nodes of the access tree T in the Fig. 1 can be represented as:
. To briefly describe the access tree, shown in Fig. 1 , some functions and terms are defined as follows: • (x, y). It represents a node of tree T . If (x, y) is a leaf node, it represents an attribute. Otherwise, (x, y) represents a threshold gate, such as ''AND,'' ''OR'' and ''N-of-M (N<M)''.
• num (x,y) . It represents the number of node (x, y)'s child nodes. For example, num (C) = num (3,1) = 2.
• th (x,y) . It represents threshold value of node (x, y) (0 < th (x,y) ≤ num (x,y) ). If (x, y) is not a leaf node, (x, y) is a ''OR'' gate when th (x,y) = 1 and (x, y) is an ''AND'' gate when th (x,y) = num (x,y) . If (x, y) is a leaf node, th (x,y) = 1. For example, th R = th (1,1) = 1 denotes a ''OR'' gate and th C = th (3,1) = 2 denotes an ''AND'' gate.
•
It represents level node of T , where T contains σ levels. Note that the hierarchies of nodes are sorted in descending order. For example, (x 1 , y 1 ) is located in 1 and (x σ , y σ ) is in the lowest hierarchy σ .
• parent(x, y). It denotes parent node of node (x, y). For example, parent(E) = parent(4, 1) = C.
• Transport node. If one of node (x, y)'s child nodes owns at least one threshold gate, then (x, y) is a transport node. For example, R and A are transport nodes.
• CNT (x, y). It denotes a threshold gate set of transport node (x, y)'s child nodes. For example, CNT (R) = CNT (1, 1) = A.
• att(x, y). It denotes an attribute associated with a leaf node (x, y).
• index(x, y). It represents a unique value that is associated with node (x, y). The index value is uniquely assigned to (x, y) for a given key in an arbitrary way.
• T (x,y) . It represents a sub-tree, the root of the sub-tree is node (x, y). T (x,y) (S) = 1 if an attribute set S satisfies T (x,y) . Otherwise, the value of T (x,y) is calculated as follows. If (x, y) is a leaf node, the value of T (x,y) (S) is 1 when att(x, y) ∈ S. If (x, y) is not a leaf node, the value of T (x,y) (S) is 1 when at least th (x,y) child nodes returns 1.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To better illustrate our scheme, in this section, the system and threat model, system framework and security model are described respectively.
A. SYSTEM & THREAT MODEL
As shown in Fig. 2 , our IoT-oriented health system mainly involves four various types of entities: Trusted Authority (TA), Data Owner, Healthcare Cloud Server (HCS) and Data Users. In this IoT-oriented health system, the TA (hospital authority) takes charge of producing the system public parameters (step 1 ) and creates secret key for each system user (step 3 ). Before data owner sends his/her Electronic Health Records (e.g., Electrocardiogram (ECC), Electroencephalography (ECG), Blood Pressure (BP)), she/he needs to collect her/his EHR through assigned wireless protocols (e.g., Zigbee, Wifi, Bluetooth) via the wearable IoT devices (e.g., mobile terminals, sports bracelet). Then, the gathered EHRs are encrypted under the specified access policy and then outsourced in the ciphertext form to HCS (step 2 ). When a data user (e.g., Physician and nurse) intends to gain the most relevant top-k EHRs, she/he uses her/his secret key associated with the attribute set to generate the trapdoor, which is regarded as the search query that is sent to the HCS (step 4 ). In the process of step 5 , the HCS will check whether the attribute set of the data user satisfies the access policy. If it holds, then the HCS returns the most top-k targeted relevance ciphertexts to the data users (step 6 ). After that, the encrypted data is recovered by the data user with lightweight computation cost. In the scheme, the TA is deemed to be a fully trusted entity and the data owner is supposed to honestly share her/his own data. The cloud server in our threat model is assumed to be semi-trusted, which means that the cloud server will honestly perform the protocols but it also attempts to peek at any private information about data privacy and trapdoor privacy.
B. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
Our scheme consists of six algorithms described as follows:
• (msk, pk) ← Setup(1 κ ). The algorithm is performed by TA. Output public key pk and master secret key msk according to security level κ.
• sk ← KeyGen(pk, msk, S). The algorithm is also conducted by TA. Output secret key sk to data users based on attribute set S, public key pk and master secret key msk.
• (C, IC, I ) ← Enc(pk, W , F, EK , T ). The algorithm is carried out by data owner. Output ciphertext set C, integrated ciphertexts IC and encrypted index set I to the cloud server by taking public keypk, keyword dictionary W , file set F, symmetric encryption key set EK and access tree T as input.
• (T ω , q, QL, k) ← Tpdr(pk, sk, S, Q). The algorithm is executed by data user. Output trapdoor T ω , query vector q, query location set QL and required search result number k to cloud server depended on public key pk, secret key sk, user's attribute set S and queried keyword set Q.
The algorithm is run by cloud server. Output top-k relevance ciphertext set TC, top-k relevance integrated ciphertext set TI and hierarchy set CH by taking public key pk, ciphertext set C, user's attribute set S, T ω , query vector q, query location set QL, required search result number k, integrated ciphertext IC, encrypted index set I as input.
• (ek i (i ∈ CH )) ← Dec(pk, sk, S, TC, TI ). The algorithm is implemented by data user. Output k symmetric encryption keys ek i (i ∈ CH ) according to public key pk, user's secret key sk, user's attribute set S, top-k relevance ciphertext set TC and top-k relevance integrated ciphertext set TI .
C. SECURITY MODEL
Security games for fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search are given to prove it to be secure against chosen plaintext and keyword attacks between a challenger B and an adversary A. For any set of queried keywords, A has the ability to obtain corresponding trapdoors. In the games, A cannot gain any information about the plaintext and keyword in the challenge ciphertext without being given any matching private key and search token. The security is slightly weaker, as A should submit an access structure A * to B at the beginning of the game.
• Security game for chosen plaintext attacks is described below: Setup: At first, A sends a challenge access structure A * to B. Then, B runs Setup(1 κ ) to generate a public key pk and a master secret key msk. Finally, B gives public key pk to A. , and then submits the challenge keyword ciphertext IC * to A. Note that the produced challenge ciphertext is encryption of keyword set instead of that of plaintext. Guess: A outputs its guess β ∈ {1, 2} and wins the game if β = β. Definition 2: We define A's advantage in the above game as |Pr[α = α ] − 1/2|. We say that our fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme is semantically secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the advantage in the security for any adversary A is negligible.
Definition 3:
We define A's advantage in the above game as |Pr[β = β ] − 1/2|. We say that our fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme is semantically secure under chosen keyword attacks if the advantage in the security for any adversary A is negligible.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Here, we propose a fine-grained ranked multi-keyword search scheme over hierarchical data for IoT-oriented health system, the overview of our scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
This step is performed by TA to generate the public parameters and the secret key for the system and each legitimate data users.
• (msk, pk) ← Setup(1 κ ). Given the security level κ, TA first chooses a bilinear group BG = (G 0 , G 1 , p, e, g ), where g is a generator of G 0 , p is a prime order of both G 0 and G 1 . Next, TA chooses five elements (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 , β) ∈ Z p randomly and three hash functions H 0 (·), H 1 (·), H 2 (·), where H 0 :
TA finally publishes the generated public key pk and VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 3. Overview of our scheme.
master secret key msk as:
• sk ← KeyGen(pk, msk, S). It takes the attribute set S ⊆ A (A is the attribute set of system) of the data user as input. Firstly, for each attribute ∈ S, TA randomly chooses two elements (s, s ) ∈ Z p . Then, TA calculates the secret key for data user as:
B. GENERATION OF CIPHERTEXT AND INDEXES
(C, IC, I ) ← Enc(pk, W , F, EK , T ). The process is done by data owner at this phase and divided into five parts, as shown in Algorithm 1. The specifical process is presented as follows:
• Given the file set F = {F 1 , · · · , F σ }, the number of file is σ , as shown in step 1 , data owner first encrypts the file set with the symmetric encryption key set EK =
to encrypt the symmetric encryption key set EK = {ek 1 , · · · , ek σ }. Note that F has σ access levels and each level only is attached with one file, which is described in system model. And as shown in step 2 , the algorithm encrypts the key set EK as:
• As shown in step 3 , based on the keyword dictionary W = {ω 1 , · · · , ω τ }, the number of keyword is τ , the data owner uses the TF-IDF rule to generate
Algorithm 1 Cipertext and Indexes Generation
Input: Public key pk, file set According to the keyword dictionary, compute the keyword relevance score vector SO i ; 4: for = 1 to τ do 5: if ω ∈ F i then 6: Compute {π , π }; 7: end if 8: end for 9: end for 10: for (x, y) ∈ LN do 11: Compute {L (x,y) , L (x,y) }; 12: end for 13: for (x, y) ∈ TN do 14: Set CNT (x) = {child 1 , · · · , child , · · · }; 15: Compute L (x,y), ; 16 : end for 17 
the relevance score vector SO i = {SO i,1 , · · · , SO i,τ } for each F i . And the -th element of SO i is the relevance score of keyword ω in file F i , which is computed as:
where f ω ,F i is the frequency of ω in F i , |F| is the total number of files, f ω is the number of files containing ω . If the F i does not contain ω , the corresponding value SO i, is set as 0. Then, the data owner utilizes the AOPPF algorithm [32] to encrypt the scores, the encrypted SO i is denoted as SO i , the -th element of SO i is equivalent to SE i, . The process describes as below, where the data owner identity is denoted as ID:
aoppf (SO i, ).
• For each keyword ω in the keyword dictionary, if ω in the F i , the data owner chooses a random element θ ∈ Z p and computes ρ = g α 3 θ , π i = g α 2 γ i . Then, he/she calculates
Otherwise, the π i, , π i are set as 1. The set π i is denoted
• Polynomial structure rule: for every node (x, y) in access tree T , the data owner chooses a d (x,y) -degree polynomial p (x,y) . Starting from the root node, the data owner randomly selects the nodes' information of p (x,y) from top to bottom manner. d (x,y) is set as d (x,y) = th (x,y) − 1 (th (x,y) is the threshold value of (x, y)).
Beginning from the root node (x 1 , y 1 ) of T , the data owner sets p (x 1 ,y 1 ) (0) = γ 1 and chooses d (x 1 ,y 1 ) points of p (x 1 ,y 1 ) to completely define it. For other non-root node (x, y), the data owner sets , y) ). Let LN be the leaf node set, for each node (x, y) in the leaf node set LN , the tuple (L (x,y) , L (x,y) ) can be computed by the data owner as:
• TN denotes the transport node set in the T , and CNT (x, y) denotes the threshold gate set of each transport node (x, y)'s child nodes ((x, y) ∈ TN ), where
in the TN and all = {1, 2, . . .}, L (x,y), is calculated as:
Finally, the triple {C, IC, I } is sent to the HCS by the data owner, where C is the ciphertext set,
C. GENERATION OF TRAPDOOR
(T ω , q, QL, k) ← Tpdr(pk, sk, S, Q). As shown in step 4 , the step is implemented by data user. To be more specific, the data user first generates the queried keyword set Q = { ω 1 , · · · , ω n } (the number of queried keyword is n) and gives required search result number k to HCS. Then, he/she generates a τ -dimensional query vector q and a query location set QL based on the correspondence between the Q and the keyword dictionary W , where the generation process of vector q and set QL are described below: Initialize each element q j ∈ q to 0. If the keyword in Q appears in the position j of keyword dictionary W , then q j is set to 1 and put j into set QL. Subsequently, the data user chooses a random value v ∈ Z p randomly and outputs the trapdoor T ω by computing as follows:
;
Finally, the data user sends the quintuple {T ω , S, q, QL, k} to HCS.
D. PROCESS OF RETRIEVAL
(TC, TI , CH ) ← Retr(pk, C, S, T ω , q, QL, k, IC, I ). In this procedure, the HCS performs the retrieval process on data user's behalf to gain the top-k relevant results, the detailed process is shown in Algorithm 2. Firstly, as shown in step 5 , the S is checked if it satisfies the specified access tree T by HCS. If the data owner is a legitimate entity, the recursive algorithm is then implemented by HCS to get (x,y) as follows:
• If (x, y) is a leaf node and att(x, y) = / ∈ S, (x,y) is set to be ⊥. Otherwise, (x,y) is computed as:
= z svp (x,y) (0) .
• If (x, y) is not a leaf node, for each child node d of (x, y), HCS computes the value d . Let R (x,y) be an arbitrary th (x,y) -sized child node set d, thereby d = ⊥. If the set does not exist, d = ⊥. Otherwise, (x,y) is computed as:
where
Based on the descriptions in preliminary part, the level node of (x, y) is denoted as (x i , y i ). If the highest hierarchy accessed by the data user is i, the cloud server can compute (x l ,y l ) = z svγ l . Then, for each (x l , y l )(l ∈ [i, σ ]). HCS checks whether if the encrypted index set I matches the trapdoor by the following equation.
Algorithm 2 Process of Retrieval
Input: Public key pk, ciphertext set C, integrated ciphertexts IC, encrypted index set I , access tree T , attribute set S, trapdoor T ω , query vector q, query location set QL, leaf node set LN . Output: top-k relevance ciphertext set TC, top-k relevance integrated ciphertext set TI , hierarchy set CH . 1: for each node (x, y) ∈ T &&(x, y) ∈ LN do 2: if att(x, y) = ∈ S then 3: Compute (x,y) = e( t ,L (x,y)) e( t ,L (x,y) ) ; 4: end if 5: end for 6: for each node (x, y) ∈ T &&(x, y) / ∈ LN do 7: Denote k (x,y) -sized child node set as R (x,y) ; 8: if each node d ∈ R (x,y) then 9: Compute d = ⊥;
10:
end if 11: Compute (x,y) =
12: end for 13: Denote the highest hierarchy can be accessed as i; 14: Initialize a new list SL; 15: for l = i to l = σ do 16: Mark (x l ,y l ) = z svγ l ; 17: Judge e(
if equation holds then 19: score l = SO l · q; 20: Put score l into SL; 21: end if 22 : end for 23: Select the top-k values from SL; 24: Put the top-k searched ciphertexts into set TC; 25: Put the top-k searched integrated ciphertexts into set TI ; 26: Record the top-k hierarchies into set CH ; 27: Return TC, TI , CH .
If the equation holds, HCS first computes the inner product score l of keyword relevance score vector SO l and keyword relevance score query vector q. Then, HCS puts all computed score l into the list SL. HCS then selects the top-k values from SL. Finally, HCS returns the most relevant results {TC, TI , CH } corresponding to the top-k values to data user as shown in step 6 , where TC denotes the most top-k relevance ciphertext set, TI refers to the most top-k relevance integrated ciphertext and CH represents the access level set of corresponding top-k relevance ciphertexts. Otherwise, it aborts and outputs ⊥.
E. DECRYPTION OF SEARCH RESULTS
(ek i (i ∈ CH )) ← Dec(pk, sk, S, TC, TI ). If user's attribute set S holds the partial or whole T , for each i ∈ CH , the data user can compute (x i ,y i ) = z svγ i . Next, the data user calculates φ i as:
Based on the hierarchical access structure, if the user attribute S satisfies the lower authorization nodes, the data user computes φ i+1, for each child node child ( ∈ CH ) by utilizing the value of L (x i ,y i ), , where child node child ∈ CNT (x, y) as:
Thereby, the data user can gain the values of z βγ j , · · · , z βγ i , · · · (i ∈ CH ). Then, he/she can derive the top-k symmetric key set {ek j , · · · , ek i , · · · } as:
Finally, as shown in step 7 , the top-k ciphertexts in the set TC = {C j , · · · , C i , · · · } can be decrypted with the corresponding symmetric key set {ek j , · · · , ek i , · · · } by the data user.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present a brief security analysis and performance evaluation to demonstrate that the proposed scheme is secure and practical in the actual applications.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Since our proposed scheme is constructed by combining ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) [9] and keyword search [28] technologies together, the security of our scheme inherits both the CPA-security of the scheme [9] and the CKA-security of the scheme [28] . Specifically, provided that the selective security game could not be breached by the adversary A, then our proposed scheme can achieve the selective-security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) and chosen keyword attacks (CKA). The security of our proposed scheme can be ensured by the following theorems.
Theorem 1: Assume that the DBDH assumption is intractable, the proposed scheme is then said to achieve selective CPA-security in the random oracle model.
Proof : Assume that adversary A breaks the CPA-security with a non-negligible advantage = Adv CPA A (1 κ ) in our scheme, then a simulator B is built to distinguish the DBDH tuple from a random tuple. Given a bilinear group BG = (G 0 , G 1 , p, e, g ), the challenger first randomly chooses (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 ) ∈ Z p , b ∈ {0, 1} * , ι ∈ G 1 , where g is a generator of G 0 . Next, he/she sets R = e(g, g) α 1 α 2 α 3 if b = 0; otherwise, R = ι. Finally, he/she will paly his/her role in the CPA security game by sending the five-tuple (g, g α 1 , g α 2 , g α 3 , R). The data owner outputs the cipertexts IC = {T , KC i , KC i , L (x,y), } by taking file F i and its corresponding key ek i as input(i ∈ [1, σ ]). Then, the CPA security game between A and B is defined as follows:
Init. At first, A sends a challenge access structure A * to B. Setup. Firstly, B randomly chooses β ∈ Z p and defines β = β + α 1 α 2 . Next, he/she calculates z = e(g, g) β = e (g, g) β e(g, g) α 1 α 2 and defines g α 4 = g α 2 . Finally, he/she returns the partial public key pk = {z, g α 4 } to A.
Query phase 1. In this phase, A delivers an attribute set to S * = * ∈ T (where * / ∈ A * ) to B. Then, A can issue the query for the secret key sk. Later, B chooses an element s ∈ Z p and defines s = s * − α 1 . Next, B can get o 2 = g (β+s)/α 4 = g 
Query phase 2. The processes of this phase are the same as Query phase 1.
Guess. A guess bit b ∈ {0, 1} is returned by A. If b = b, B outputs 0 demonstrating R = z α 1 α 2 α 3 ; otherwise, he/she returns 1 demonstrating R is a random element ι ∈ G 1 .
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme is then said to achieve selective CKA-security in the general bilinear group model, where H 0 is denoted as a one-way hash function and H 1 is indicated as a random oracle.
Proof: Assume that the adversary A will attempt to distinguish between g α 1 (θ+γ i ) g
from g µ if the probability of A breaking the CKA game is . Therefore, an modified CKA game is considered where A can distinguish g α 1 (θ+γ i ) from g . The modified CKA game is conducted as follows:
Setup. Firstly, B randomly chooses (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 ) ∈ Z p . After that, the tuple (G 0 , G 1 , p, e, g, g α 1 , g α 2 , g α 3 ) is sent to A. Then, A picks a tree T * and sends it to B. Finally, B releases the simulation as follows. If an attribute has never been queried, B chooses τ ∈ Z p . Then, the ( , τ ) is added into the list O H 1 and g τ is output. If an attribute has been queried, B outputs g τ through directly selecting τ from O H 1 . Phase 1. In this phase, A issues the O KeyGen and O Tpdr oracles as follows:
• O KeyGen : At first, B randomly selects s * ∈ Z p after gaining the attribute set S * and calculates o 1 = g (α 1 α 3 +s * )/α 2 . Next, he/she chooses s * ∈ Z p and calculates
Finally, the part (S * , o 1 , {t , t } ∈S * ) of secret key sk is returned to A.
• O Tpdr : Firstly, B gets the tuple (S * , o 1 , {t , t } ∈S * ) by utilizing the O KeyGen oracle. Next, he/she selects a random element v * ∈ Z p and gains the search token T ω = (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , { t , t } ∈S * ) based on the queried keyword set ω, where
The keyword set ω is added into the keyword list L ω if the attribute set S * satisfies the access tree T * . Challenge. Given two equal length keyword sets (ω 0 , ω 1 ) for challenging, B first randomly picks θ ∈ Z p and γ i for every access level. Next, he selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Phase 2. The processes of this phase are the same as Phase 1.
If A can build z χα 1 (θ +γ i ) for some g χ , which can be consisted of the outputs in the Phase 1 or Phase 2, then A has the ability to distinguish g µ from g α 1 (θ +γ i ) . However, the A still needs to be proved that it can build z χα 1 (θ+γ i ) for some g χ with a negligible advantage. That is, the CKA game cannot be broken with a non-negligible advantage by A.
Given the two groups G 0 = {ϕ 0 (ς )|ς ∈ Z p }, G 1 = {ϕ 1 (ς )|ς ∈ Z p }, where ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 are two random maps from field Z p into a set of p 3 elements in the generic group model, and A guesses the image of ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 with a negligible advantage. Therefore, the advantage of A in building z χα 1 (θ +γ i ) for some χ ∈ Z p from the aforementioned outputs is needed. χ should include factor α 3 to construct z χα 1 (θ+γ i ) since the element θ only appears in the term α 3 θ . In other words, χ = χ α 3 and A attempt to construct z χ α 3 α 1 (θ+γ i ) . Therefore, α 1 α 3 γ i χ by leveraging the term α 2 γ i and (α 1 α 3 + s * )/α 2 is still required by A. A needs to cancel s * γ i by utilizing terms τ , s * + τ s * , p (x,y) (0), τ p (x,y) (0) in spite of he/she can gain α 1 α 3 γ i + s * γ i . Whereas, A cannot construct these terms because s * γ i can be constructed if and only if the attributes corresponding to s * satisfy the access tree T * . Therefore, A can break the CKA game with a negligible advantage. In other words, our scheme is secure against the CKA game in the generic bilinear group model.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Before analyzing the performance, we first compare our scheme with several related schemes [9] , [10] , [15] , [18] , [20] , [23] , [28] , [29] in TABLE 1. As shown in TABLE 1, only our scheme supports the functions of fine-grained access control, hierarchical data, multi-keyword search, ranked keyword retrieval, outsourced decryption simultaneously, while the others can just support partial functionalities. In this paper, our main aim is to achieve one-to-many data share, outsourced decryption and ranked multi-keyword search over hierarchical data at the same time, which determines the search accuracy and fine-grained access efficiency. So, in this part, the schemes [15] , [20] are picked to compare with our proposed scheme in terms of the storage and computation cost since one of them provides fine-grained data share and data search over hierarchical data and another one provides ranked multi-keyword search.
For comparison convenience, t e 0 , t e 1 , t H 0 , t H 1 and t p are exploited to denote an exponentiation computation cost in G 0 , an exponentiation computation cost in G 1 , a hash operation cost mapping the arbitrary string to group G 0 , a hash operation cost mapping the arbitrary string to group G 1 and a bilinear pairing computation cost. In addition, an element length in G 0 , an element length in G 1 and an element in Z p are denoted as |G 0 |, |G 1 | and |Z p |, respectively. As shown in [20] is lower than that in ours since the storage cost in Zhang et al.'s scheme [20] grows with a number of queried keywords while that in ours increases with the number of attributes. For example, when large number of keywords is queried and the small number of user attributes is involved, our scheme has a lower storage cost than that in Zhang et al.'s scheme [20] with regard to storage overhead. On the contrary, when small number of keywords is queried and the large number of user attribute is involved, our scheme has a bad storage cost. In addition, ciphertext size in Miao et al.'s scheme [15] is |F||G 0 |+(|F|+ jN + N )|G 1 | while in ours is k|G 0 | + (k + jN + N )|G 1 |, and the scheme Zhang et al.'s scheme [20] does not provide this functionality of data sharing. In a large-scale data sharing system, the value of k is obviously much smaller than |F|. In this way, our scheme has greater advantages in ciphertext size compared to Miao et al.'s scheme [15] . As for the comparisons of secret key size and index size, similar conclusions can be obtained as aforementioned.
In TABLE 3 , for computation cost in KeyGen, Enc, Tpdr, Retr, Dec algorithm, our scheme requires (2y + 3)t e 0 + yt H 1 , (2|F| + 2x + n)t e 0 + xt H 1 , (2y + 4)t e 0 , (2y + 3)t p + 2t e 1 , kt e 0 respectively while the other two schemes need (2y + 3)t e 0 + yt H 1 , (2|F| + 2x + n)t e 0 + xt H 1 , (2y + 4)t e 0 , |F|t e 0 and nt H 0 , 2nt e 0 , (1 + u)t e 0 , (n + u + 1)t p . From these data comparisons, it's easy to see that, compared to the computation cost in Miao et al.'s scheme [15] , the computation efficiency of Dec algorithm in ours seems to be little lower in a large scale data sharing system, which means that our proposed scheme is more efficient and practical. Cryptography (PBC) library [34] are simulated. In detail, we simulate these experiments using C++ on windows 10 64 bits operation system with Inter(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @3.60 GHz and 8GB RAM. To attain the 80-bit security level, the simulations for these schemes are tested based on a 20-byte elliptic curveÂčÂž z 2 = x 3 + x over a 64-byte finite field. Here, |Z p | = 20 bytes, |G 0 | = |G 1 | = 128 bytes. In these simulations, the computation costs of one pairing operation, an exponentiation computation in G 0 and an exponentiation computation in G 1 , hash operation time cost for H 0 , H 1 are 11.712ms, 6.062ms, 1.899ms, 0.05ms, 0.05ms, respectively [33] .
For ease of comparison, we set the number of undifferentiated |F| files to two times the number of top-k files (|F| = 2k = 10). We also set the number of transport nodes N = 5 and the number of a transport node's child nodes j = 2. We set that the number of keywords in dictionary is the same as number of queried keywords in trapdoor (n = u) and the number of attributes in system is equal to the number of user attributes (x = y). This is because that when the number of keywords in dictionary is the same as the number of queried keywords in trapdoor (n = u) and the number of attributes in system is equal to the number of user attributes (x = y), the computation and storage cost is the highest in terms of setup, key generation, encryption, search and decryption algorithms. The following two cases are considered. One case is n = u = 30 > x = y = 10 and another case is n = u = x = y = 10. This is to say, the first case is to consider large number of keywords and the other one is to consider a small number of keywords.
In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(c [20] scheme and our scheme when x = y = 10, n = u = 30 and x = y = 10, n = u = 10. From  Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(c) , we can observe that the storage and communication cost in our scheme is less than those in both Miao et al.'s scheme [15] and Zhang et al.'s scheme [20] in terms of index size, trapdoor size and ciphertext size when x = y = 10, n = u = 30. In addition, we can see that the storage and communication cost in our scheme is higher than that in Zhang et al.'s [20] scheme but still less than that in Miao et al.'s scheme [15] when x = y = 10, n = u = 10. Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(d) for the communication cost, the same conclusion can be easily summarized as that of storage and communication cost comparison.
In summary, the storage and computation cost in ours is lower than Miao et al.'s scheme [15] but still desirable compared to Zhang et al.'s scheme [20] , especially in a large scale data sharing system. At the same time, compared to the other two schemes, our scheme has more feasible functions involve indicating the relevance between queried keywords and search results, and realizing fine-grained access control over hierarchical data simultaneously. And when the data volume is enormous, our scheme can greatly reduce the computing and storage burden of data users due to its ranked and outsourced functionalities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained ranked multikeyword search scheme over hierarchical data that is applicable to IoT-oriented health systems. To be more specific, the proposed scheme supports fine-grained data access, ranked multi-keyword search over hierarchical data and outsourced decryption. Besides, our security analysis and performance evaluation reveal that the proposed scheme is secure, practical and feasible for real-world applications.
In future work, we would extend this proposed scheme to achieve the verifiability of returned results (e.g., searching and outsourcing tasks) for data users. In addition, supporting other functionalities for various practical scenarios is also a potential research work we will explore. 
